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Abstract
The main security service in the connected world of cyber physical systems necessitates to authenticate a large
number of nodes privately. In this paper, the private authentication problem is considered, that consists of a certificate
authority, a verifier, many legitimate users (prover) and any arbitrary number of illegitimate users. Each legitimate
user wants to be authenticated (using his personal key) by the verifier, while simultaneously wants to stay completely
anonymous (even to the verifier and the CA). On the other hand, an illegitimate user must fail to authenticate
himself. We analyze this problem from an information theoretical perspective. First, we propose a general interactive
information-theoretic model for the problem. As a metric to measure the reliability, we consider the authentication
key rate whose rate maximization has a trade-off with establishing privacy. Then, we analyze the problem in two
different regimes: finite size regime (i.e., the variables are elements of a finite field) and asymptotic regime (i.e.,
the variables are considered to have large enough length). For both regimes, we propose schemes that satisfy the
completeness, soundness and privacy properties. In finite size regime, the idea is to generate the authentication keys
according to a secret sharing scheme. In asymptotic regime, we use a random binning based scheme which relies
on the joint typicality to generate the authentication keys. Moreover, providing the converse proof, we show that our
scheme achieves capacity in the asymptotic regime. For finite size regime our scheme achieves capacity for large field
size.
Index Terms
Information theoretic privacy, private authentication, Shamir’s secret sharing, random binning.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growth of cyber physical systems, the authentication is an essential security feature in the communication
systems. The authentication protocol seeks the answer to who sends the data, is the user authorized to access the
service or is the message received unaltered. Thus, based on application, these protocols may authenticate the user
2or the message. The traditional cryptography-based method for user authentication is based on key validation, that
is if the key is valid according to a data set, e.g., public key or passwords. While for the message authentication,
traditionally signed hash of the message is used.
Nowadays, by increasing concerns about privacy, users wish to stay anonymous when sending authentication
requests. This has many emerging applications such as vehicular network [1], cloud computing, distributed servers
[2], crypto-currencies and services on blockchain [3]. There is an inherent contradiction between the authentication
and the privacy, for example a user wants to prove he has permission to access a service but he does not want to reveal
his identity. In this paper, we study this problem, i.e., a private authentication (PA) problem, where a legitimate user
can pass the authentication, but he does not reveal his identity even to the server (he hides in a group of users), while
an illegitimate user (attacker) fails to authenticate. This happens in practice that the server should not distinguish the
one who requests the service with which key is authenticated [1]. Though there are cryptographic based method that
uses tokens for private authentication, to the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been studied fundamentally.
Traditional solutions for private authentication (privacy against external attacker) is based on computational com-
plexity crypto method which is studied in works such as [4] and [5]. However, the problem can be studied in an
information theoretically setup to find its fundamental limits. With no privacy concern, authentication problem has been
studied fundamentally in works such as [6]–[8]. In [6], Simmons considers message authentication over a noiseless
channel with a shared key between two sides of authentication, where the lower bounds for impersonation attack and
substitution attack are established. In [7], this work has been extended to noisy channels. In [8] hypothesis testing
is proposed to derive generalized lower bounds on impersonation attack and substitution attack. Using characteristics
of wireless channel, keyless authentication has been analyzed in works such as [9], [10]. All these works consider
message authentication with no privacy constraints. There are also some works that consider privacy from information
theory perspective. With no connection to the authentication problem, [11] derives the capacity of private information
retrieval, and [12] studies privacy in data base systems. In biometric security systems, a user wishes to authenticate
himself by some biometric characteristics, such as fingerprint, which is called enrollment sequence. The privacy
leakage is leakage of information about enrollment sequence. [13], [14] derived the trade-off between secret key rate
and privacy leakage rate.
In this paper, we consider a PA problem consisting of a certificate authority (CA), a verifier (i.e., server), many
legitimate users and any number of attackers. A legitimate user wishes to be authenticated to gain access to a service,
while he wants to stay anonymous to anyone observing the authentication process (including the verifier). An attacker
wants to impersonate himself as a legitimate user and gain access to the service, he is not permitted to. The verifier
wants to understand that the user who requests authentication (prover) either is a legitimate user or is an attacker.
CA is an entity that shares correlated randomness between the verifier and the legitimate users. This randomness can
be used by the verifier in the authentication process to distinguish an attacker from a legitimate user.
3In an authentication protocol, two conditions should be considered: the legitimate user who follows the protocol
can pass the authentication (completeness condition) and an attacker fails to authenticate (soundness condition). The
privacy condition is satisfied when the user stays anonymous, i.e., the verifier cannot distinguish legitimate users
identities. In addition, it is desirable that the exposure of the key of a user releases as less information as possible,
so we consider a reliability metric as total key rate of the users.
As a solution to the above problem, we propose a general interactive information-theoretic protocol. Our proposed
PA protocol is considered in two regimes: finite size and asymptotic regimes. In finite regime, the variables used in
the PA protocol are elements of a finite field. In asymptotic regime, the variables of the protocol are sequences of
length n, for arbitrary large n.
For both the finite and asymptotic regimes, we propose an achievable protocol. This means that in each case we
propose a PA protocol that satisfies the completeness, soundness and privacy conditions. In the finite regime if the
size of the field tends to infinity the achievable rate reaches the upper bound. In the asymptotic regime, the proposed
scheme achieves the capacity. Our finite size scheme uses the idea that the key of the legitimate users should lie on
a specific polynomial (inspired by Shamir secret sharing [16]). Here, the completeness and privacy conditions are
satisfied with probability 1 and the probability of soundness is its maximum. For the asymptotic regime, we propose
an optimal scheme, where the main idea is using the random binning and the joint typicality between the keys of
the legitimate users and the data available at the verifier. All three conditions (completeness, soundness and privacy)
are satisfied with probabilities arbitrary close to 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model. In Section III, the
finite size scheme is proposed and its conditions are analyzed. In Section IV, the asymptotic scheme is considered.
We conclude the paper in Section V.
Notations: Capital letters are used to show random variables and small letters are their realizations. The mutual
information between X and Y is shown with I(X;Y ), H(X) shows the entropy of discrete random variable X
and h(x) is the differential entropy of X. [K] = {1, 2, · · · ,K} and X ∼ Y means that X and Y are identically
distributed.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A PA protocol consists of a CA, a verifier, K legitimate users and an attacker1. Each legitimate user wishes to
authenticate himself to the verifier without revealing his identity. The PA protocol shown in Fig. 1, has two phase:
1) Key distribution phase: in this phase CA generates the set V ∈ V using encoding function fc :W → V , where W
is an authentication space, and sends V to the verifier. Using mapping fk : V → C on V for k ∈ [K], CA generates
Ck ∈ C as personal key of user k and sets C = {C1, · · · , CK} ∈ C
K . CA sends Ck to legitimate user k, each Ck will
1Only one attacker is considered, but any number of them can be tolerated.
4be used to authenticate user k. 2) Authentication phase: user k wants to prove knowledge of Ck ∈ V for k ∈ [K]
without revealing index “k” to the verifier. A prover is a user who sends the authentication request to the verifier.
We have two cases:
Case I: H = 0, the prover is the legitimate user
Case II: H = 1, the prover is an attacker.
When the prover claims that he has some c˜ ∈ C , the verifier decides on Hˆ, where Hˆ = 0 means the verifier
accepts the prover as the legitimate user, and Hˆ = 1 means that the verfifier rejects the prover.
The Authentication phase shown in Fig. 1, consists of three steps.
Case I: H = 0
Step 1: The verifier, knowing V , uses encoding function fv : V → S×M to generate S andM , i.e., (S,M) = fv(V ).
The output of the encoding function has two parts because one part is used as secret for authentication in
the following steps, S, and the other part is used as helper data for the prover, M . So, the verifier keeps S
and sends M to the prover.
Step 2: The prover (legitimate user k) computes Sˆk = fp(M,Ck), where fp : M× C → S is a decoding function.
The prover sends Sˆk to the verifier.
Step 3: If Sˆk = S, the verifier accepts the prover and announces Hˆ = 0. Otherwise, he rejects the prover and
announces Hˆ = 1.
Case II: H = 1
Step 1: Since the verifier has no knowledge of H at the beginning of the authentication phase, this step is exactly
the same as the first step of case I. So, the same as first step of case I the verifier generates (S,M), keeps
S and sends M to the prover.
Step 2: The prover (an attacker) computes Sˆ = f ′p(M), since the only information available at the attacker is M . f
′
p
can be any decoding function such that f ′p :M→ S . The prover sends Sˆ to the verifier.
Step 3: The same as step 3 of case I, if Sˆ = S, the verifier accepts the prover and announces Hˆ = 0. Otherwise, he
rejects the prover and announces Hˆ = 1.
The PA protocol should satisfy three constraints: completeness, soundness and privacy.
The completeness property assures that a legitimate user is accepted. This means that if the prover is the legitimate
user, then the verifier announces Hˆ = 0. So, we define Pe1-completeness constraint as:
Pe1-completeness: P[Hˆ = 1|H = 0] ≤ Pe1.
Next, the soundness property guarantees that an attacker is rejected. This means that if the prover is an attacker, then
the verifier announces Hˆ = 1. So, we define Pe2-soundness constraint as:
Pe2-soundness: P[Hˆ = 0|H = 1] ≤ Pe2.
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Verifier Prover (user k)
W
V ck
(S,M) = fv(V )
M
Sˆk = fp(M, ck)Sˆk
accept if Sˆk = S
reject if Sˆk 6= S
(a) Case I
CA
Verifier Attacker
W
V
(S,M) = fv(V )
M
Sˆ = f ′p(M)Sˆ
accept if Sˆ = S
reject if Sˆ 6= S
(b) Case II
Fig. 1. PA Protocol. In key distribution phase, CA generates V and C = {c1, · · · , cK} ∈ C
K using fc : W → V and fk : V → C, he sends
V to the verifier and ck to the user k. In Authentication phase, the verifier generates S as a secret and M as a helper data using encoding
function fv and it sends M to the prover. If the prover is the legitimate user (case I), he uses decoding function fp on ck and M to compute
Sˆk and sends Sˆk to the verifier. If the prover is an attacker (case II), he uses M and an arbitrary decoding function f
′
p to compute Sˆ and
sends Sˆ to the verifier. If the received secret at the verifier is equal to S, the prover passes authentication, unless he fails.
To make user identity private, k-th prover’s request should be indistinguishable from the verifier’s perspective, i.e.,
knowing M and V all requests must be identically distributed. So perfect privacy is defined as:
Perfect Privacy: (Sˆ1, S,M, V ) ∼ (Sˆk, S,M, V ), ∀k ∈ [K].
In the proposed model, we use the Pp-privacy property as following:
Pp-privacy: P
[
(Sˆ1, S,M, V ) ∼ (Sˆk, S,M, V ), ∀k ∈ [K]
]
≥ 1− Pp.
Since Ck is the personal key of user k, it is desired that (C1, C2, · · · , CK) has the maximum entropy, so that
exposure of a user’s key reveals minimum information about other users’ keys. In other words, users wish others
gain as less information as possible about their keys. On the other hand, for preserving privacy, it is desired that the
personal key of the users have common information. This common information is used for authentication without
revealing the identity of the user. So, there is a trade-off between maximizing this entropy and establishing privacy.
Considering l as the length of the keys, we define reliability metric as total key rate:
R =
H(C1, C2, · · · , CK)
l
.
Our goal is to design a PA protocol that satisfies completeness, soundness and privacy properties. Two regimes are
considered: finite size and asymptotic regimes. In the finite size regime, the variables of the protocol are elements
of a finite field and in the asymptotic regime, the elements of the protocol are sequences of length n, with arbitrary
large n.
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Fig. 2. An example for the finite length scheme. Key of each legitimate user is a random point on the polynomial. For authentication, the
user proves his key is on the polynomial.
Definition 1: A key rate R is achievable for a PA protocol in the finite size regime, if there are encoding functions
fc and fv, a decoding function fp and mapping functions fk for k ∈ [K], such that Pe1 = 0, Pe2 =
1
|S| and Pp = 0.
Definition 2: A key rate R is achievable for a PA protocol in the asymptotic regime, if there are encoding functions
fc and fv, a decoding function fp and mapping functions fk for k ∈ [K], such that Pe1, Pe2 and Pp tend to zero as
the length of the variables goes to infinity.
Definition 3: The key capacity for a PA protocol is:
C , sup{R : R is an achievable key rate for a PA protocol}.
For both regimes, we design achievable protocols and for asymptotic regime we show optimality of the proposed
protocol.
III. FINITE SIZE REGIME
In this section, we consider a finite field version of the protocol, thus we assume all the variables of the protocol
are chosen as elements of a finite field, i.e, W = GF (qL), C = (GF (qL))lc , V = (GF (qL))lv , M = (GF (qL))lm
and S = (GF (qL))ls , which q is a prime number and L is a finite integer. lc, lv, lm and ls are integers that will be
determined through the scheme. All operations in this section are done in the finite field GF (qL).
In the following, we propose an achievable PA protocol for the finite regime case. Also we show that the key rate
of the proposed scheme tends to the upper bound when the size of the field is large. The design of the protocol is
inspired by the idea of Shamir’s secret sharing [16]. The idea shown in Fig. 2, is that if the prover is a legitimate
user, his key (Ck) must fit in a polynomial. The degree of this polynomial is d = K. Also, d is known to all parties
participating in the protocol.
Theorem 1: The key rate R = K2 +
1
2L logq
(
qL
K
)
is achievable for a PA protocol in finite size regime.
Proof: First, we design coding of the protocol:
7CA: Using his encoding function fc, CA generates K random points (as the keys of the legitimate users) and
compute the polynomial passes through these points. The details of the encoding function and mapping functions at
CA are as follow:
1) CA chooses X1,X2, · · · ,XK (K distinct random numbers) from the finite field GF (q
L), and CA chooses
K variables from the the field W = GF (qL), independently and uniformly at random and sets them as
Y1, Y2, · · · YK .
2) CA chooses a0 from the field W = GF (q
L) independently and uniformly at random.
3) The outputs of encoding function and mapping functions at CA are fc: V = {a0, (X1, Y1), · · · , (XK , YK)} and
fk: Ck = (Xk, YK). So, lv = 2K + 1 and lc = 2
4) CA sends V to the verifier and Ck to the user k for k ∈ [K].
Verifier: The verifier sets a0 as the secret. The detail follows:
1) Having access to V , the verifier sets S = a0.
2) Since k + 1 points can uniquely determine a k degree polynomial, the verifier computes unique polynomial
f(X) of degree d = K that passes through {(0, a0), (X1, Y1), · · · , (XK , YK)}.
3) The verifier selects d new points from the space GF (qL), that is the verifier chooses at random d distinct
elements M1,M2, · · · ,Md of GF (q
L) where Mi 6= Xj , ∀i = 1, · · · , d and ∀j = 1, · · · ,K. To make this
possible we need that qL ≥ K + d + 1. The verifier computes the value of polynomial at the new points, i.e.,
f(Mi) for i ∈ {1, · · · , d}.
4) The outputs of encoding function at the verifier are fv: M = {(M1, f(M1)), · · · , (Md, f(Md))} and S = a0.
So, lm = 2d = 2K and ls = 1.
5) The verifier sends M to the prover and keeps S.
Prover (legitimate user k): Using decoding function fp, the prover wishes to prove that his key is a valid point
on the polynomial f(x). The detail of the decoding function follows:
1) Since a d degree polynomial can cover d+ 1 randomly chosen points from a GF (qL), knowing M and Ck =
(Xk, f(Xk)), the prover has access to d + 1 distinct points of the polynomial f(x) (of degree d), so he can
derive the polynomial and compute a0.
2) The output of the decoding function at the prover is fp: Sˆk = a0.
Remark 1: The attacker only knows M . He can use any arbitrary decoding function f ′p to estimate S. His success
probability is derived in the analysis of the soundness property.
Now with determining coding functions, we show the 0-completeness, 1|S| -soundness and 0-privacy properties of
the proposed protocol.
0-completeness: The user k has (Xk, YK) andM = {(M1, f(M1)), · · · , (Md, f(Md))}, d+1 points of polynomial,
8derives the polynomial with Lagrange interpolation and compute a0 [16]. So, Sˆk = S = a0 for all k ∈ [K] and thus:
P[Hˆ = 1|H = 0] = P[Sˆk 6= S] = 0. (1)
This proves the 0-completeness property of the scheme.
1
|S| -soundness: By information theoretic secrecy of Shamir secret sharing M does not give any information about
S [16], [17], i.e., I(S;M) = 0. This means that if the prover is an attacker, by observing M (d points of the
polynomial), the attacker gets no information about the secret. Considering that H(S) = log|S| (S is uniformly
distributed) and using Lemma 1 in Appendix A (by substituting α = 0), we have:
P[Hˆ = 0|H = 1] = P[Sˆ = S] ≤
1
qL
. (2)
This means that, the best possible attack strategy is to guess the secret. Thus, the success probability of the attacker
is equal to 1
qL
, and it shows the larger the size of the finite field, the lower the probability of attack. This completes
the proof of 1|S| -soundness property.
0-privacy: As stated above, every legitimate user can compute S correctly. So, Sˆ1 = Sˆk = S for all k ∈ [K].
Thus, (Sˆ1, S,M, V ) ∼ (Sˆk, S,M, V ) for all k ∈ [K], and 0-Privacy is satisfied. This means, since every legitimate
prover always sends S, the verifier can not distinguish which user requests the authentication.
Now with determining the protocol we can compute the key rate of the proposed protocol:
R =
H(C1, C2, · · · , CK)
l
=
H((X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), · · · , (XK , YK))
2L
(a)
=
H(X1, · · · ,XK) +
∑K
i=1H(Yi)
2L
(b)
=
logq
(
qL
K
)
+KL
2L
(3)
where (a) comes from the fact that Yi, for i ∈ [K], is chosen uniformly at random, and (b) can be obtained by
considering that X1,X2, · · · ,XK are chosen uniformly at random from all subsets of cardinality K of the field
GF (qL).
Corollary 1: It is obvious that an upper bound on key rate equals to K and (3) tends to this upper bound, K, as
qL →∞, proof follows:
We must show that limqL→∞
(
qL
K
)
= Θ
(
(qL)K
)
.(
qL
K
)
=
(qL)!
K!(qL −K)!
=
1
K!
(qL)!(qL − 1)! · · · (qL −K + 1)!
=
(qL)K
K!
(
1
(
1−
1
qL
)(
1−
2
qL
)
· · ·
(
1−
K − 1
qL
))
(a)
= Θ
(
(qL)K
)
where (a) follows from the fact that K is fixed.
Remark 2: Again, by information theoretic secrecy of Shamir secret sharing, we know that the attacker can not
derive the polynomial and thus he can not get much information about V (the only information available at the
attacker is the set M ). Setting qL >> d, we conclude I(M ;V ) is negligible.
9. . .
S = 1 S = 2n(I(U ;Y )−ϕ(ξ))
M = 1
. . .
S = 1 S = 2n(I(U ;Y )−ϕ(ξ))
M = 2
. . .
. . .
S = 1 S = 2n(I(U ;Y )−ϕ(ξ))
M = 2n(I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y )+ϕ(ξ)+ϕ(ξ
′))
Fig. 3. The binning scheme of Theorem 2. The dots show the u(m, s) sequences where the bin index is the helper data sent by the verifier
to the prover and s is the secret the verifier keeps.
Remark 3: It should be noted that any time, the verifier receives an authentication request, he must send exactly
the same set M to the prover. More precisely, if the prover is an attacker and the set M sends to him in two requests,
differs only in one point, then he has d+ 1 points that the polynomial f(x) fits. Thus, he can compute S correctly.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC REGIME
In this section, we consider the asymptotic version of the PA protocol, i.e., all the variables of the protocol are
sequences of length n for arbitrary large n, in particular we define Ck = Y
n
k .
We propose the optimal PA protocol for its asymptotic version. This means that we show that the key rate of the
proposed protocol achieves capacity. The idea is to provide the verifier and the legitimate provers with correlated data
(which is done by CA). And then to verify the existence of this correlation. This verification is based on a random
binning technique shown in Fig. 3 and is done in an interactive protocol. The idea was also used in the biometric
security systems [13], [14] in a different setup.
Theorem 2: The capacity of the PA protocol in asymptotic scheme is equal to KH(Y ).
Proof: Converse: For converse, it is obvious that R ≤ KH(Y ).
Achivability: The proof is based on the strong typicality defined in [18]. We propose the achievable scheme by
defining the encoding, decoding and mapping functions at CA, the verifier and the legitimate users.
CA: First we describe the codebook generation at CA. Considering auxiliary random variables X ∈ X and U ∈ U ,
fix a joint distribution PUXY (u, x, y) = PX(x)PY |X(y|x) PU |X(u|x), i.e., U → X → Y forms a Markov chain such
that 0 < I(U ;Y ) ≤ I(X;Y ) = µ. obtaining PU (u) =
∑
x PUX(ux) and fixing ξ and ξ
′ such that ξ > ξ′ > 0, form
the set Q by randomly and independently generating 2nR˜ sequences of Un, each according to
∏n
i=1 PU (ui).
Randomly partition the set Q to 2nR
′
equal size subsets (bins), as shown in Fig. 3. So, each bin contains 2n(R˜−R
′)
sequences. Each sequence un ∈ Q can be shown as un(m, s), where m is the bin index and s is the index of
sequence in the bin m. The sequences un(m, s) constitutes the codebook, which is revealed to every participants of
the protocol (the verifier and the provers).
Now, we describe the details of encoding function fc and mapping functions fk:
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1) From marginal distribution PX(x), generate an i.i.d sequence X
n.
2) Conditioned on Xn, randomly and conditionally independently generate K sequences Y n1 , Y
n
2 , · · · , Y
n
K each
according to the conditional distribution PY |X(y|x), i.e., Y
n
k |X
n ∼
∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi) for k ∈ [K].
3) The outputs of encoding function and mapping functions at CA are
fc: V = {X
n, Y n1 , Y
n
2 , · · · , Y
n
K} and
fk: ck = Y
n
k .
4) CA sends V to the verifier and ck to the user k for k ∈ [K].
Verifier: Using encoding function fv, the verifier determines S and M based on finding jointly typical sequences
Un with Xn. The detail of the encoding function follows:
1) Let T
(n)
ξ′ (X,U) be the set of jointly typical sequences (X,U). The verifier finds a sequence u
n ∈ Q that is
jointly typical with Xn, i.e., (Xn, un(m, s)) ∈ T nξ′ (X,U). If no such sequence exists, the verifier chooses a
sequence from Q randomly. If there are more than one sequence, the verifier chooses one of them randomly.
2) Knowing un, its bin index, m, and the index of sequence in the bin, s, are the outputs of encoding function,
that is M = m and S = s.
3) The verifier sends M to the prover and keeps S.
Prover (legitimate user k): The prover wants to prove that his key, Y nk is correlated to the verifier’s sequence
Xn. Thus knowing the bin index, he estimates uˆ as a sequence in that bin. The detail follows:
1) Having access to Y nk and bin index M , the prover looks for a sequence u
n in bin M that is jointly typical with
Y nk , i.e., (u
n(M,s), Y n) ∈ T
(n)
ξ (U, Y ). one of the following cases occur:
• There is only one sequence in bin M that is jointly typical with Y n 7−→ the prover takes this sequence as
uˆn.
• There are more than one sequence in bin M that are jointly typical with Y n 7−→ the prover chooses one
of these sequences randomly and sets the chosen sequence as uˆn.
• There is no sequence in bin M that is jointly typical with Y n 7−→ the prover chooses uˆn at random from
the bin M .
2) The index (sˆ) of uˆn in bin M is the output of the decoding function at the prover, i.e., fp: Sˆk = sˆ.
Remark 4: The attacker only knows M , i.e., the index of the bin. His information about the index of sequence in
the bin (the secret) and his success probability is discussed in analysis of soundness in Appendix B.
An outline of the analysis of probabilities of error follows. The detailed analysis is provided in Appendix B :
For completeness, error occurs if Sˆk 6= S. By setting R˜ > I(U ;X) and R˜ − R
′ < I(U ;Y ), there are more than
2nI(U ;X) sequences in Q, using covering lemma [18], with high probability the verifier finds a sequence un that is
jointly typical with Xn. On the other hand, by law of large number (LLN), the prover finds a sequence uˆn that
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is jointly typical with Y nk . And by packing lemma, with high probability the prover finds a unique sequence. This
proves that limn→∞ Pe1 = 0.
The soundness property is derived by showing that as n→∞, 1
n
I(S;M)→ 0 and using Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
If {Sˆ1 6= Sˆk}, privacy may be violated. So P[Sˆ1 6= Sˆk] is an upper bound on the probability of the event that privacy
is violated. Utilizing similar technique used in the proof of completeness property we show that the probability of
Sˆ1 6= Sˆk tends to zero. Since the number of legitimate prover is finite (K), the probability of Sˆ1 6= Sˆk for k ∈ [K]
tends to zero.
Now, we analyze the key rate of the proposed scheme:
R =
H(C1, C2, · · · , CK)
n
=
H(Y n1 , · · · , Y
n
K)
n
≥
H(Y n1 , · · · , Y
n
K |X
n)
n
(a)
=
1
n
K∑
i−1
H(Y ni |X
n)
(b)
= KH(Y |X),
where (a) comes from the fact that Y n1 , Y
n
2 , · · · , Y
n
K are independent from each other conditioned on X
n and (b) is
derived by Y nk |X
n ∼
∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi) for k ∈ [K].
In the converse we showed that R ≤ KH(Y ). The difference of H(Y ) and H(Y |X) is equal to I(X;Y ) = µ. If
µ→ 0, then C = KH(Y ) is achievable.
Remark 5: Probability of soundness is proportional to 1
nI(U ;Y ) . Setting U = X, results in the fastest diminishing
probability of soundness.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Computational complexity in the finite size scheme: We consider the participants of the protocol derive the
coefficient of the polynomial by Lagrange interpolation. However, there are efficient algorithms that can compute a0
directly from d+ 1 points without driving the polynomial [19]. Therefore the computational complexity is of order
d.
Non secure links: In the system model, we assume the links between the participants are secure. But, when the
links are non-secure, i.e., there is an eavesdropper that can hear Sˆk for k ∈ [K], the problem is an interesting future
direction.
Security condition: An extra condition can be considered, by which the prover should not get any further
information about other users’ keys at the end of the PA protocol. This means that H(ci|M, ck) = H(ci|ck) for
i ∈ [K]\{k}. This condition is satisfied in the asymptotic scheme. But, in the finite length scheme, the legitimate
prover knows that f(x) fits the legitimate users’ keys. And, he knows that the points in M are not the keys of
legitimate user. This reveals to him that any other points on the polynomial (not in M and not his own key) is a
possible key for the other legitimate users. So, to reduce the information leakage about the other users’ key in the
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protocol we must have qL >> K. Note that the condition H(ci|M, ck) = H(ci) cannot be satisfied simultaneously
with the privacy property. Because, for privacy, some correlation between legitimate users’ keys is needed.
Partition to smaller groups: To satisfy the above security condition in finite length scheme, our scheme concludes
qL >> K. One solution can be to partition the legitimate users into smaller groups with maximum size of K ′ < K
and PA protocol can be performed within these smaller groups. Then, it is enough to have qL >> K ′. However, this
weakens the privacy.
APPENDIX A
LEMMA 1
Lemma 1: If I(U ;Q) < α, where U ∈ U and Q ∈ Q, then P[U = g(Q)] ≤ 1+α+log |U|−H(U)log |U| , with g : Q → U
any arbitrary function.
Proof: Consider Uˆ = g(Q). Putting e = P[U 6= Uˆ ] and using Fano inequality:
H(U |Uˆ) ≤ 1 + e log |U|. (4)
Since I(U ;Q) < α, we obtain I(U ; Uˆ ) < α and thus:
H(U |Uˆ) ≥ H(U)− α,
substituting in (4) we have:
H(U)− α ≤ 1 + e log |U|,
noting that 1− e = P[U = Uˆ ], we get:
P[U = Uˆ ] ≤
1 + α+ log |U| −H(U)
log |U|
.
APPENDIX B
PROBABILITY OF ERROR ANALYSIS OF THEOREM 2
To complete the proof, here we have to show that in the proposed scheme Pe1, Pe2 and PP tends to zero as n
goes to infinity.
Proof: completeness: The verifier rejects (Hˆ = 1) the legitimate prover (user k, H = 1) if Sˆk 6= S, and this
may happen if one of the following events occurs:
1) E1: The verifier does not find a sequence u
n that is jointly typical with Xn.
2) E2: User k does not find a sequence uˆ
n that is jointly typical with Y nk .
3) E3: User k finds more than one sequence uˆ
n in bin M that is jointly typical with Y nk .
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Using the union, bound we obtain:
P[Hˆ = 1|H = 0] = P[Sˆk 6= S] ≤ P[E1] + P[E2 ∩ E
c
1] + P[E3 ∩ E
c
1]. (5)
By covering lemma [18], if R˜ ≥ I(X;U) + ϕ(ξ′) (there are more than 2nI(U ;X) sequences in Q), P[E1]→ 0 when
n → ∞. Also, using law of large numbers (LLN) and the fact that ξ > ξ′, P[E2 ∩ E
c
1] → 0 as n → ∞. And if
R˜ − R′ ≤ I(U ;Y ) − ϕ(ξ) (there exist less than 2nI(U ;Y ) sequences in bin M ), according to packing lemma [18],
P[E2∩E
c
1]→ 0 for large enough n. ϕ(ξ) and ϕ(ξ
′) are functions of ξ and ξ′, respectively, that goes to 0 as ξ, ξ′ → 0.
So, by setting R˜ = I(X;U) + ϕ(ξ′) and R′ = I(X;U) − I(U ;Y ) + ϕ(ξ) + ϕ(ξ′), we obtain:
lim
n→∞
P[Hˆ = 1|H = 0] = 0. (6)
This proves the completeness property of the proposed scheme.
soundness: From [13, equation (31)], we have I(S;M) ≤ n(ϕ(ξ′)+ ζ), where ζ is a function of ξ′ and goes to 0
as n→∞. This means that the data the verifier sends to the prover contains negligible information about the secret
in average. Substituting α = n(ϕ(ξ′) + ζ) in Lemma 1, we conclude that P[S = Sˆ] ≤ 1+n(ϕ(ξ
′)+ζ+log |S|−H(S))
log |S| .
Since S ranges from 1 to 2n(I(U ;Y )−ϕ(ξ)), we have log |S| = n(I(U ;Y ) − ϕ(ξ)) and using [13, equation (30)],
H(S) ≥ n(I(U ;Y )− ϕ(ξ)− ϕ(ξ′)− ζ . Thus,
P[Hˆ = 0|H = 1] = P[S = Sˆ] ≤
1 + n(2ζ + 2ϕ(ξ′))
n(I(U ;Y )− ϕ(ξ))
. (7)
Since we can choose ξ and ξ′ such that limn→∞
(2ζ+2ϕ(ξ′))
(I(U ;Y )−ϕ(ξ)) → 0, the soundness property is proved.
privacy: Now we analyze Pp-privacy property of the suggested protocol. First we define the event E as:
E =
[
(Sˆ1, S,M, V ) ∼ (Sˆk, S,M, V ), ∀k ∈ [K]
]
.
If event E happens with probability 1, we have perfect privacy. Now we consider the case that E does not occur.
P[Ec] = P
[
(Sˆ1, S,M, V ) ≁ (Sˆk, S,M, V ), ∀k ∈ [K]
] (a)
≤ P[Sˆ1 6= Sˆk, ∀k ∈ [K]]
(b)
≤
K∑
k=2
P[Sˆ1 6= Sˆk]. (8)
Where (a) comes from the fact that if (Sˆ1, S,M, V ) ≁ (Sˆk, S,M, V ), then Sˆ1 6= Sˆk, however there are situations
that Sˆ1 6= Sˆk but (Sˆ1, S,M, V ) ∼ (Sˆk, S,M, V ). And (b) can be obtained using union bound. Now, for a fixed k we
compute P[Sˆ1 6= Sˆk]. {Sˆ1 6= Sˆk} may happen in the following cases:
• P1: The verifier does not find a sequence u
n that is jointly typical with Xn.
• P2: Both user 1 and user k does not find a sequence uˆ
n that is jointly typical with Y n1 and Y
n
k , respectively.
• P3: User 1 finds a unique uˆ
n that is jointly typical with Y n1 , but user k does not find a sequence uˆ
n that is
jointly typical with Y nk .
• P4: User k finds a unique uˆ
n that is jointly typical with Y nk , but user 1 can not find a sequence uˆ
n that is jointly
typical with Y n1 .
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• P5: User 1 finds a unique uˆ
n that is jointly typical with Y n1 , but user k finds more than one sequence uˆ
n that
are jointly typical with Y nk .
• P6: USer 1 does not find a sequence uˆ
n that is jointly typical with Y n1 , but user k finds more than one sequence
uˆn that are jointly typical with Y nk .
• P7: User k finds a unique uˆ
n that is jointly typical with Y nk , but user 1 finds more than one sequence uˆ
n that
are jointly typical with Y n1 .
• P8: User k does not find a sequence uˆ
n that is jointly typical with Y nk , but user 1 finds more than one sequence
uˆn that are jointly typical with Y n1 .
• P9 Both user 1 and user k find more than one sequence uˆ
n that are jointly typical with Y n1 and Y
n
k , respectively.
Using union bound, we have:
P[Sˆ1 6= Sˆk] ≤
9∑
i=1
P[Pi]. (9)
It should be considered that, there are 2n(I(U ;X)+ϕ(ξ
′)) in Q and there are 2n(I(U ;Y )−ϕ(ξ)) sequences in each bin. as
a result By covering lemma, P[P1]→ 0. By LLN, P[P2], P[P3] and P[P4] goes to zero when n is sufficiently large.
By packing lemma and LLN, P[Pi] for i ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8, 9} tends to zero as n→∞. So, we conclude:
lim
n→∞
P[Sˆ1 6= Sˆk] = 0, (10)
and since K is fixed:
lim
n→∞
P[Ec] = 0,
and
lim
n→∞
P
[
(Sˆ1, S,M, V ) ∼ (Sˆk, S,M, V ) ∀k ∈ [K]
]
= 1. (11)
This completes privacy property.
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